A new voting rule for electing committees is described. Specifically, we use approval balloting and propose a new voting procedure that guarantees that if there is a committee that represents (with a given proportion of representatives) all of the existing voters, then the selected committee has to represent all of voters in at least the…
A minimum cost spanning tree problem analyzes how to efficiently connect a group of individuals to a source. Once the efficient tree is obtained, the addressed question is how to allocate the total cost among the involved agents. One prominent solution in allocating this minimum cost is the so-called Folk solution. Unfortunately, in general, the…
We study minimum cost spanning tree problems for a set of users connected to a source. Prim’s algorithm provides a way of finding the minimum cost tree m. This has led to several definitions in the literature, regarding how to distribute the cost. These rules propose different cost allocations, which can be understood as compensations…
We consider a (standard) reverse auction for dual sourcing and propose to determine both the providers’ shares and the reserve price endogenously, depending on the suppliers’ bids. Our benchmark considers a two-stage game of complete information. After a first round of bidding, the two most competitive suppliers advance to the second stage and compete again…
Sequential mechanisms to solve matching problems are useful to promote (hidden) cooperation between agents. Taking as a starting point the MIRC mechanism, employed in Spain to match medical students and residency programs in privately owned hospitals, we find that: (1) In the current system, where the number of students that each program might enroll is…
We revisit the concept of fairness in the Student Placement framework. We declare an allocation as α-equitable if no agent can propose an alternative allocation that nobody else might argue to be inequitable. It turns out that α-equity is compatible with efficiency. Our analysis fills a gap in the literature by giving normative support to…
ABSTRACT Pulido et al. (Annals Oper Res 158:133–141, 2008) present an extension of the classical bankruptcy problem (O’Neill in Math Social Sci 2:345–371, 1982) where the involved agents have, apart from the claims vector, an additional reference vector. To analyze this extended problem, they propose the extreme and the diago- nal approaches, both of them…
Abstract: Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims…
Abstract: The problem of sharing a cost M among n individuals, identified by some characteristic ci in R+, appears in many real situations. Two important proposals on how to share the cost are the egalitarian and the proportional solutions. In different situations a combination of both distributions provides an interesting approach to the cost sharing…
ABSTRACT Following Bossert (1995), we consider a model where personal income depends on two different characteristics: skills and effort. Luttens (2010) introduces claims that individuals have over aggregate income and that only depend on the effort they exert. Moreover, he proposes redistribution mechanisms in which solidarity is based on changes in a lower bound on…
