Seminario 20/09: Alfonso Rosa (UM): Preventing (panic) bank runs.

bank run

We  study experimentally how to prevent bank runs using a mechanism inspired in Andolfatto et al. (2017). They propose a mechanism that eliminates bank runs as an equilibrium situation of the deposit contract and implements uniquely the efficient outcome. In our experimental enviroment bank runs may emerge both as a coordination failure in equilibrium and…

Seminario 20/03: Ainoa Aparicio Fenoll (U. Turin) – The Best in the Class

The_best_Class

Abstract: I estimate the effect of being the best in the class} in the early years of schooling on future academic performance. I implement a novel methodology that does not require experimental data. My methodology exploits that some students are the best in the class because better students in the same school are assigned to…

Seminario 19/13: Francisco Cabo (U. Valladolid) – Interaction and imitation between Sanchos and Quixotes: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium

Monumento_al_Quijote_y_Sancho

The paper analyzes the interaction between individuals belonging to two distinct populations, who share the same strategy set but differ in their payoff matrices. A two-population evolutionary game describes this interaction, that presents a double dimension. On the one hand, agents in one population play a game against individuals within their own and also the…

Seminario19/14: José Carlos González Pimienta (UC3M) – Costly voting: a large-scale real effort experiment.

Votación_del_Congreso_Nacional_de_Chile_(1826)

We test the turnout predictions of the canonical costly voting model through a large-scale, real effort experiment. We recruit 1,200  participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and employ a 2 x 2 between subjects design encompassing small ( N = 30) and large ( N = 300) elections, as well as close and lopsided. As predicted,…

Seminario 19/11: David Jiménez Gómez (U. Alicante) – Nudging and phishing: a theory of behavioral welfare economics

social-welfare

Abstract: Nudges, which are interventions that do not restrict choice, have become widespread in policy applications. I develop a general and tractable framework to analyze the welfare implications of nudges. In this framework, individuals suffer from internalities (their utility when choosing is different from their welfare-determining utility) and choice and welfare depend on the environment,…

Seminario 19/2: Juan Vicente Llinares (UM) and Susana Álvarez (UM) – A New Index to Measure Educational Poverty and its Application to the OECD countries from PISA 2009 – 2015

chart-data-desk-590022

Abstract: The consequences that educational underperformance has on both individuals and society as a whole lead policy makers and planners to focus on how to measure it properly. The aim of this paper is to propose an index to measure educational poverty which, taking as a starting point the economic literature on multidimensional poverty measurement,…

Seminario 18/19: Lorenzo Ductor (Middlesex University) – Connections to Decision Makers: evidence from economics editors

Magnifying lens  on the background of the stack of magazines

Abstract: Are connections to decision makers valuable? Do connections lead to better or worse decisions? And if they do, why is that? We set out to answer these questions by studying connections to the editorial board members of more than 100 economics and finance journals over the period 1990-2011. Departments double their publications in a journal when…

Seminario 18/05: David Jiménez Gómez (U. Alicante)- Evolution of Self-Control in the Brain

self-control

ABSTRACT. Temptation and self-control evolved as single mechanism to make humans behave against their own self-interest. I follow a recent literature in Economics on the evolution of preferences, by modeling the evolution of self-control in a principal-agent framework. The principal can obtain the first best asymptotically by biasing the utility of the agent (from which…

Seminario 18/02: Jordi Massó (Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona) – Not all majority-based social choice functions are obviously strategy-proof

plurality-majority

Abstract We consider two families of strategy-proof social choice functions based on the majority principle: extended majority voting rules on the universal domain of preferences over two alternatives and generalized median voter schemes on the domain of single-peaked preferences over a finite and linearly ordered set of alternatives. We characterize their respective subclasses of obviously…

Seminario 17/07: Mª José Gutierrez (U. País Vasco) – Harvesting Control Rules that deal with Scientific Uncertainty

uncertainty

Abstract: By using robustness methods we design HCRs that explicitly include scientific uncertainty. Under scientific uncertainty –when the perceived model can be generated by a nearby operating model– robust HCRs are designed assuming that the (inferred) operating model is more persistent than the perceived model. As a result, a robust HCR has a steeper ratio…