Sistema de costos en cadenas de suministro y compras conjuntas con descuento: un enfoque de teoría de juegos

  • Autor: Gerardo Alexander Vergara Mesa
  • Director/es: Ana Meca Martínez, José Antonio García Martínez
  • Defensa: 22/7/2024 - Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche
  • Tribunal: María Gloria Fiestras Janeiro, Alejandro Saavedra Nieves, Carlos Gutiérrez Hita
  • Calificación: Sobresaliente
  • Ver publicaciones relacionadas

RESUMEN:

La presente tesis doctoral propone inicialmente, un sistema de costos para la cadena de suministro del sector panificador en Colombia, especialmente conformado por Micro, Pequeñas y Medianas Empresas (MiPymes). Se introduce la metáfora de considerar la cadena de suministro como una sola empresa, lo cual facilita la generación de indicadores horizontales fundamentales y prácticos. Estos indicadores incluyen el costo unitario, precio y margen unitarios equivalentes, así como el peso relativo de cada eslabón en la cadena. La metodología utilizada se basa en un estudio de caso, donde los resultados pueden ser útiles para tomar decisiones que fomenten la colaboración, optimicen los recursos y mejoren la rentabilidad. Posteriormente, nos enfocamos en la cooperación en compras conjuntas en una parte de la cadena. Analizamos situaciones de compra cooperativa, denominadas juegos de compras conjuntas con descuento general (juegos CCDG). Demostramos que la gran coalición puede obtener reducciones significativas en los costos, ya que los juegos CCDG son subaditivos. Luego, mostramos que estos juegos son equilibrados mediante la aplicación de la regla Equal Price (EP), la cual garantiza la eficiencia y estabilidad en la asignación de costos reducidos generados por el modelo CCDG. Posteriormente, nos concentramos en un enfoque alternativo para obtener reglas Different Price (DP) para juegos de compra cooperativa con descuento lineal (juegos CCNL). Este enfoque consiste en repartir proporcionalmente el costo de la gran coalición, considerando los costos individuales y la regla EP. Obtenemos una familia paramétrica de reglas proporcionales, denominadas reglas α-proporcionales, que están relacionadas con la familia de reglas Balanced Different Price (reglas BDP). Demostramos que siempre hay un umbral α por encima del cual cualquier regla α-proporcional es una regla BDP, lo cual establece un rango de parámetros aceptables para todos los agentes, tanto grandes como pequeños compradores. Finalmente, se realiza una aplicación de compras conjuntas en el sector panificador en Colombia, en dos eslabones de la cadena, para validar las propiedades de las reglas utilizando datos reales. Esto confirma la coherencia teórica y proporciona información que facilita la comprensión e identificación de oportunidades para formular estrategias en compras cooperativas.

ABSTRACT:

In some situations, sellers of certain commodities usually provide price discounts for large orders according to a decreasing unit price function. Buyers of such commodities can cooperate and form purchasing groups to benefit from these price discounts. A natural way to allocate the corresponding cost reductions is the equal price rule. We analyze this situation as a cooperative game. We show that when the decreasing unit price function is linear, the equal price rule coincides with the Shapley value and the nucleolus of the cooperative game. However, some buyers may argue that the equal price rule is not acceptable because it favors those who buy just a few units of the product. This can be more problematic when the decreasing unit price function is nonlinear: In that case, the equal price rule loses some of its good properties and it no longer matches the Shapley value or the nucleolus. Unlike the linear case, in this nonlinear case, the Shapley value and nucleolus do not assign the same price to all agents, so there are different price rules. However, they have a computability problem, as both are very laborious to calculate for a large number of agents. To find a suitable alternative, we first study the properties that a different price rule should have in this situation. Second, we propose a family of different price rules that hold those properties and are easy to calculate for a large number of agents. This family of different price rules provides buyers (companies, institutions, consumers, etc.) with an easy-to-implement method which ensures stability in cooperative purchasing.

WP_Query Object ( [query] => Array ( [post_type] => publicaciones [meta_key] => _wpcf_belongs_tesis_id [meta_value] => 3960 ) [query_vars] => Array ( [post_type] => publicaciones [meta_key] => _wpcf_belongs_tesis_id [meta_value] => 3960 [error] => [m] => [p] => 0 [post_parent] => [subpost] => [subpost_id] => [attachment] => [attachment_id] => 0 [name] => [pagename] => [page_id] => 0 [second] => [minute] => [hour] => [day] => 0 [monthnum] => 0 [year] => 0 [w] => 0 [category_name] => [tag] => [cat] => [tag_id] => [author] => [author_name] => [feed] => [tb] => [paged] => 0 [preview] => [s] => [sentence] => [title] => [fields] => [menu_order] => [embed] => [category__in] => Array ( ) [category__not_in] => Array ( ) [category__and] => Array ( ) [post__in] => Array ( ) [post__not_in] => Array ( ) [post_name__in] => Array ( ) [tag__in] => Array ( ) [tag__not_in] => Array ( ) [tag__and] => Array ( ) [tag_slug__in] => Array ( ) [tag_slug__and] => Array ( ) [post_parent__in] => Array ( ) [post_parent__not_in] => Array ( ) [author__in] => Array ( ) [author__not_in] => Array ( ) [ignore_sticky_posts] => [suppress_filters] => [cache_results] => 1 [update_post_term_cache] => 1 [lazy_load_term_meta] => 1 [update_post_meta_cache] => 1 [posts_per_page] => 10 [nopaging] => [comments_per_page] => 50 [no_found_rows] => [order] => DESC ) [tax_query] => WP_Tax_Query Object ( [queries] => Array ( ) [relation] => AND [table_aliases:protected] => Array ( ) [queried_terms] => Array ( ) [primary_table] => wp_posts [primary_id_column] => ID ) [meta_query] => WP_Meta_Query Object ( [queries] => Array ( [0] => Array ( [key] => _wpcf_belongs_tesis_id [value] => 3960 ) [relation] => OR ) [relation] => AND [meta_table] => wp_postmeta [meta_id_column] => post_id [primary_table] => wp_posts [primary_id_column] => ID [table_aliases:protected] => Array ( [0] => wp_postmeta ) [clauses:protected] => Array ( [wp_postmeta] => Array ( [key] => _wpcf_belongs_tesis_id [value] => 3960 [compare] => = [compare_key] => = [alias] => wp_postmeta [cast] => CHAR ) ) [has_or_relation:protected] => ) [date_query] => [request] => SELECT SQL_CALC_FOUND_ROWS wp_posts.ID FROM wp_posts INNER JOIN wp_postmeta ON ( wp_posts.ID = wp_postmeta.post_id ) WHERE 1=1 AND ( ( wp_postmeta.meta_key = '_wpcf_belongs_tesis_id' AND wp_postmeta.meta_value = '3960' ) ) AND ((wp_posts.post_type = 'publicaciones' AND (wp_posts.post_status = 'publish'))) GROUP BY wp_posts.ID ORDER BY wp_posts.post_date DESC LIMIT 0, 10 [posts] => Array ( [0] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 3936 [post_author] => 19 [post_date] => 2024-09-24 12:51:15 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-09-24 10:51:15 [post_content] => Abstract In some situations, sellers of certain commodities usually provide price discounts for large orders according to a decreasing unit price function. Buyers of such commodities can cooperate and form purchasing groups to benefit from these price discounts. A natural way to allocate the corresponding cost reductions is the equal price rule. We analyze this situation as a cooperative game. We show that when the decreasing unit price function is linear, the equal price rule coincides with the Shapley value and the nucleolus of the cooperative game. However, some buyers may argue that the equal price rule is not acceptable because it favors those who buy just a few units of the product. This can be more problematic when the decreasing unit price function is nonlinear: In that case, the equal price rule loses some of its good properties and it no longer matches the Shapley value or the nucleolus. Unlike the linear case, in this nonlinear case, the Shapley value and nucleolus do not assign the same price to all agents, so there are different price rules. However, they have a computability problem, as both are very laborious to calculate for a large number of agents. To find a suitable alternative, we first study the properties that a different price rule should have in this situation. Second, we propose a family of different price rules that hold those properties and are easy to calculate for a large number of agents. This family of different price rules provides buyers (companies, institutions, consumers, etc.) with an easy-to-implement method which ensures stability in cooperative purchasing. [post_title] => Cooperative Purchasing with General Discount: A Game Theoretical Approach [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => cooperative-purchasing-with-general-discount-a-game-theoretical-approach [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-10-01 13:46:11 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-10-01 11:46:11 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => http://doctoradodecide.com/?post_type=publicaciones&p=3936 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publicaciones [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) ) [post_count] => 1 [current_post] => -1 [in_the_loop] => [post] => WP_Post Object ( [ID] => 3936 [post_author] => 19 [post_date] => 2024-09-24 12:51:15 [post_date_gmt] => 2024-09-24 10:51:15 [post_content] => Abstract In some situations, sellers of certain commodities usually provide price discounts for large orders according to a decreasing unit price function. Buyers of such commodities can cooperate and form purchasing groups to benefit from these price discounts. A natural way to allocate the corresponding cost reductions is the equal price rule. We analyze this situation as a cooperative game. We show that when the decreasing unit price function is linear, the equal price rule coincides with the Shapley value and the nucleolus of the cooperative game. However, some buyers may argue that the equal price rule is not acceptable because it favors those who buy just a few units of the product. This can be more problematic when the decreasing unit price function is nonlinear: In that case, the equal price rule loses some of its good properties and it no longer matches the Shapley value or the nucleolus. Unlike the linear case, in this nonlinear case, the Shapley value and nucleolus do not assign the same price to all agents, so there are different price rules. However, they have a computability problem, as both are very laborious to calculate for a large number of agents. To find a suitable alternative, we first study the properties that a different price rule should have in this situation. Second, we propose a family of different price rules that hold those properties and are easy to calculate for a large number of agents. This family of different price rules provides buyers (companies, institutions, consumers, etc.) with an easy-to-implement method which ensures stability in cooperative purchasing. [post_title] => Cooperative Purchasing with General Discount: A Game Theoretical Approach [post_excerpt] => [post_status] => publish [comment_status] => closed [ping_status] => closed [post_password] => [post_name] => cooperative-purchasing-with-general-discount-a-game-theoretical-approach [to_ping] => [pinged] => [post_modified] => 2024-10-01 13:46:11 [post_modified_gmt] => 2024-10-01 11:46:11 [post_content_filtered] => [post_parent] => 0 [guid] => http://doctoradodecide.com/?post_type=publicaciones&p=3936 [menu_order] => 0 [post_type] => publicaciones [post_mime_type] => [comment_count] => 0 [filter] => raw ) [comment_count] => 0 [current_comment] => -1 [found_posts] => 1 [max_num_pages] => 1 [max_num_comment_pages] => 0 [is_single] => [is_preview] => [is_page] => [is_archive] => 1 [is_date] => [is_year] => [is_month] => [is_day] => [is_time] => [is_author] => [is_category] => [is_tag] => [is_tax] => [is_search] => [is_feed] => [is_comment_feed] => [is_trackback] => [is_home] => [is_privacy_policy] => [is_404] => [is_embed] => [is_paged] => [is_admin] => [is_attachment] => [is_singular] => [is_robots] => [is_favicon] => [is_posts_page] => [is_post_type_archive] => 1 [query_vars_hash:WP_Query:private] => 1507fa4699db519cd58908ea3d911b83 [query_vars_changed:WP_Query:private] => [thumbnails_cached] => [allow_query_attachment_by_filename:protected] => [stopwords:WP_Query:private] => [compat_fields:WP_Query:private] => Array ( [0] => query_vars_hash [1] => query_vars_changed ) [compat_methods:WP_Query:private] => Array ( [0] => init_query_flags [1] => parse_tax_query ) )

Publicaciones relacionadas

Array ( [_edit_lock] => Array ( [0] => 1727783013:19 ) [_edit_last] => Array ( [0] => 19 ) [wpcf-autor] => Array ( [0] => Gerardo Alexander Vergara Mesa ) [_wpcf-autor-sort-order] => Array ( [0] => a:1:{i:0;i:28715;} ) [wpcf-director] => Array ( [0] => Ana Meca Martínez, José Antonio García Martínez ) [wpcf-fecha-defensa] => Array ( [0] => 1721606400 ) [wpcf-lugar] => Array ( [0] => Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche ) [wpcf-tribunal] => Array ( [0] => María Gloria Fiestras Janeiro Alejandro Saavedra Nieves Carlos Gutiérrez Hita ) [wpcf-calificacion] => Array ( [0] => 9 ) )