Bankruptcy Problems with two References: An Impartial Compromise

ABSTRACT Pulido et al. (Annals Oper Res 158:133–141, 2008) present an extension of the classical bankruptcy problem (O’Neill in Math Social Sci 2:345–371, 1982) where the involved agents have, apart from the claims vector, an additional reference vector. To analyze this extended problem, they propose the extreme and the diago- nal approaches, both of them…

From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: a Proportional Approach

Abstract: Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims…

Cost Sharing Solutions Defined by Non-Negative Eigenvectors

Abstract: The problem of sharing a cost M among n individuals, identified by some characteristic ci in R+, appears in many real situations. Two important proposals on how to share the cost are the egalitarian and the proportional solutions. In different situations a combination of both distributions provides an interesting approach to the cost sharing…

Participation and solidarity in redistribution mechanisms

ABSTRACT Following Bossert (1995), we consider a model where personal income depends on two different characteristics: skills and effort. Luttens (2010) introduces claims that individuals have over aggregate income and that only depend on the effort they exert. Moreover, he proposes redistribution mechanisms in which solidarity is based on changes in a lower bound on…