Pendiente de confirmar
Pendiente de Confirmar
Seminario 19/29: Annick Laruelle (UPV/EHU). Cost-Benefit analysis in participatory budgeting
Abstract: In participatory budgeting, citizens are invited to vote on different projects. Those with the most votes are chosen and implemented. The voting rules used in practice are usually based on single winner elections. A shortcoming of using these rules is that they do not take into account the costs of the projects, although those…
Seminario 19/26: Javier Rubio-Herrero, St. Mary’s University,Texas (USA) Estimación de flujos desagregados de mercancías por medio de un algoritmo genético
Presentamos un método para estimar de manera indirecta las cantidades transportadas de ciertos productos entre dos regiones en aquellos casos en los que solamente están disponibles los datos de la suma de sus flujos. Este método se basa en la aplicación de un modelo gravitacional clásico introducido en un problema de optimización. El objetivo de…
Seminario 19/23: Overqualification and skills mismatches among immigrants: the impact of host language proficiency
Abstract: Examining the determinants of qualification and skills mismatches has become a recurrent theme in the literature. Educational mismatches have serious consequences for individuals and can seriously hamper wages, job satisfaction and labour market prospects. These effects can be drammatical among immigrants, since they add up to an already disadvantaged position in the labour market….
Seminario 19/19: Carmen Herrero (Universidad de Alicante) The balanced worth: a procedure to evaluate performance in terms of ordered attributes
There are many problems in the social sciences that refer to the evaluation of the relative performance of some populations when their members’ achievements are described by a distribution of outcomes over a set of ordered categories. A new method for the evaluation of this type of problems is presented here. That method, called balanced…
Seminario 19/16: Santiago Rubio (U. Valencia) – Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements: Adaptation and Complementarity
Abstract: This paper studies the impact of adaptation on the stability of an international emission agreement. To address this issue we solve a three-stage coalition formation game where in the first stage countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their…
Seminario 19/13: Francisco Cabo (U. Valladolid) – Interaction and imitation between Sanchos and Quixotes: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium
The paper analyzes the interaction between individuals belonging to two distinct populations, who share the same strategy set but differ in their payoff matrices. A two-population evolutionary game describes this interaction, that presents a double dimension. On the one hand, agents in one population play a game against individuals within their own and also the…
Seminario19/14: José Carlos González Pimienta (UC3M) – Costly voting: a large-scale real effort experiment.
We test the turnout predictions of the canonical costly voting model through a large-scale, real effort experiment. We recruit 1,200 participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and employ a 2 x 2 between subjects design encompassing small ( N = 30) and large ( N = 300) elections, as well as close and lopsided. As predicted,…
