- Fecha(s): 09/03/2020
- Lugar: Seminario de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico (aula amarilla, torre C, segunda planta)
- Ponente: Juan José Ganuza
- Porconfirmar: 1
CANCELADO POR ENFERMEDAD DEL PONENTE. SE AVISARÁ CUANDO SE FIJE OTRA POSIBLE FECHA. ABSTRACT Relevant empirical findings point at the actual use of explicit (but imperfectly en- forceable) formal contracts by businesses alongside substantial informal dimensions in the relationship. In this paper we formally show the supporting role that formal contracts play for relational interactions. …
- Fecha(s): 23/02/2018
- Lugar: Seminario del Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y Empresa, UMU. Retransmisión en directo.
- Ponente: David Jiménez Gómez. Universidad de Alicante
ABSTRACT. Temptation and self-control evolved as single mechanism to make humans behave against their own self-interest. I follow a recent literature in Economics on the evolution of preferences, by modeling the evolution of self-control in a principal-agent framework. The principal can obtain the first best asymptotically by biasing the utility of the agent (from which…
- Fecha(s): 17/11/2017
- Lugar: Sala de Seminarios (Edificio Torretamarit), Universidad Miguel Hernández (Campus de Elche) . Se emitirá en directo o se grabará.
- Ponente: Fernando Bernstein (Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, USA)
Abstract We consider an online retailer facing heterogeneous customers with initially unknown product preferences. Customers are characterized by a diverse set of demographic and transactional attributes. The retailer can personalize the customers’ assortment offerings based on available profile information to maximize cumulative revenue. To that end, the retailer must estimate customer preferences by observing transaction…
- Fecha(s): 18/07/2017
- Lugar: Sala de Seminarios (Edificio Torretamarit), Universidad Miguel Hernández (Campus de Elche) . Se grabará.
- Ponente: Gloria Fiestras Janeiro, Universidad de Vigo
Abstract Los juegos TU como funciones de particiones son estructuras apropiadas para modelizar las ganancias/costes de una coalición teniendo en cuenta como se organizan el resto de los jugadores. En esta charla revisaremos algunos valores propuestos en la literatura, centrándonos en sus propiedades. En particular, revisaremos el valor de Myerson (Myerson 1977), el valor de…
- Fecha(s): 11/04/2017
- Lugar: Sala Seminarios (Edificio Torretamarit), Universidad MIguel Hernández de Elche. Se grabará.
- Ponente: El-Ghazali Talbi (University of Lille 1).
Abstract During the last years, interest on hybrid metaheuristics has risen considerably in the field of optimization and machine learning. The best results found for many optimization problems in science and industry are obtained by hybrid optimization algorithms. Combinations of optimization tools such as metaheuristics, mathematical programming, constraint programming and machine learning, have provided very…
- Fecha(s): 06/04/2017
- Lugar: Sala de seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit, Universidad Miguel Hernández (Campus de Elche). Se grabará.
- Ponente: José Manuel Giménez-Gómez (Universitat Rovira i Virgili)
Abstract An effective climate agreement is urgently required, yet conflict between parties prevails over cooperation. Thanks to advances in science it is now possible to quantify the global carbon budget, the amount of available cumulative CO2 emissions before crossing the 2oC threshold (Meinshausen et al., 2009). Countries carbon claims, however, exceed this. Historically such situations have been tackled…
- Fecha(s): 16/02/2017
- Lugar: Seminario del Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y Empresa, UMU. Retransmisión en directo.
- Ponente: Guiomar Martín-Herrán. Universidad de Valladolid.
Abstract: Despite the fact that the use of sporadic advertising schedules is well established in both the advertising literature and market place, the marketing channel literature that focuses on vertical interactions has consistently prescribed continuous advertising strategies over time. This paper investigates, in a bilateral monopoly context a situation in which a manufacturer and a…
- Fecha(s): 29/11/2016
- Lugar: Sala de seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit, Universidad Miguel Hernández (Campus de Elche). No se retransmitirá en directo. Se grabará.
- Ponente: Coralio Ballester
Abstract: En este trabajo analizamos un conjunto de “concursos de belleza” (“Beauty Contests”- Nagel, AER 1995) jugados en el contexto de redes económicas/sociales. Los Beauty Contests han sido utilizados en campos como las finanzas y en el estudio de la racionalidad limitada de los agentes económicos. En concreto, fue uno de los primeros juegos en…
- Fecha(s): 04/10/2016
- Lugar: Sala de seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit, Universidad Miguel Hernández (Campus de Elche). Se grabará.
- Ponente: Carmen Beviá. Universidad de Alicante
Abstract: The paper focus on the dynamics of organizations and how they design its future according to the interest of their members. Agents are grouped into three classes, high, medium and low productivity. We analyze the evolution of organizations which take decisions by majority voting. We focus on the evolution of the political power and…
- Fecha(s): 02/11/2015
- Lugar: Sala de Seminarios, Edificio Torretamarit, UMH. No se retransmitirá en directo, pero se grabará.
- Ponente: Vito Fragnelli, Università del Piemonte Orientale
Abstract Several power indices were introduced in order to account for different aspects of decisional situations. The talk presents how to deal with those situations, commonly arising in politics, in which the agents have some incompatibilities. Some comments on existing power indices and how communication structures and restricted games may allow a better evaluation of…
