Seminario 20/17: Behzad Hezarkhani (Brunel University London). Gain-sharing in urban consolidation centers

Madrid_Cityscape

Urbanconsolidation centers provide the logistical infrastructure for cooperationamong less-than-truckload carriers with contiguous destinations. The risingnumber of initiatives to establish and operate urban consolidation centers andtheir low success rates signal the need for better mechanisms to managecooperation in this context. We introduce and study cooperative situationscomprising a set of carriers with time sensitive deliveries who can…

Seminario 20/15:Marco A. López (Universidad de Alicante): El impacto social de la Matemáticas

Matemáticas_primaria

En esta presentación se analizan las diferentes razones que contribuyen a que las Matemáticas se encuentren, hoy en día, en un primer plano de actualidad. Destacaríamos, en primer lugar, su presencia, como lenguaje y herramienta fundamental, en todas las ciencias (incluidas las sociales) y ramas de la tecnología. Nos detendremos en temas específicos en los…

Seminario 20/12: Sergio Hernández (Fragile Technologies, S.L.,Murcia) El comportamiento inteligente como un problema de optimización resoluble

Inteligencia

“Se dice que todo problema es un problema de optimización, pero no sabemos cómo convertir todos los problemas en simples funciones a optimizar y, aunque lo supiésemos, no sabemos resolver el problema de la optimización de forma general; sólo sabemos hacerlo con cierta eficiencia si el dominio es convexo y la función es convexa, continua…

Seminario 20/09: Alfonso Rosa (UM): Preventing (panic) bank runs.

bank run

We  study experimentally how to prevent bank runs using a mechanism inspired in Andolfatto et al. (2017). They propose a mechanism that eliminates bank runs as an equilibrium situation of the deposit contract and implements uniquely the efficient outcome. In our experimental enviroment bank runs may emerge both as a coordination failure in equilibrium and…

Seminario 19/29: Annick Laruelle (UPV/EHU). Cost-Benefit analysis in participatory budgeting

Presupuestos

Abstract: In participatory budgeting, citizens are invited to vote on different projects. Those with the most votes are chosen and implemented. The voting rules used in practice are usually based on single winner elections. A shortcoming of using these rules is that they do not take into account the costs of the projects, although those…

Seminario 19/26: Javier Rubio-Herrero, St. Mary’s University,Texas (USA) Estimación de flujos desagregados de mercancías por medio de un algoritmo genético

genes

Presentamos un método para estimar de manera indirecta las cantidades transportadas de ciertos productos entre dos regiones en aquellos casos en los que solamente están disponibles los datos de la suma de sus flujos. Este método se basa en la aplicación de un modelo gravitacional clásico introducido en un problema de optimización. El objetivo de…

Seminario 19/23: Overqualification and skills mismatches among immigrants: the impact of host language proficiency

inmigracion

Abstract: Examining the determinants of qualification and skills mismatches has become a recurrent theme in the literature. Educational mismatches have serious consequences for individuals and can seriously hamper wages, job satisfaction and labour market prospects. These effects can be drammatical among immigrants, since they add up to an already disadvantaged position in the labour market….

Seminario 19/19: Carmen Herrero (Universidad de Alicante) The balanced worth: a procedure to evaluate performance in terms of ordered attributes

decision

There are many problems in the social sciences that refer to the evaluation of the relative performance of some populations when their members’ achievements are described by a distribution of outcomes over a set of ordered categories. A new method for the evaluation of this type of problems is presented here. That method, called balanced…

Seminario 19/16: Santiago Rubio (U. Valencia) – Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements: Adaptation and Complementarity

air-pollution

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of adaptation on the stability of an international emission agreement. To address this issue we solve a three-stage coalition formation game where in the first stage countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their…

Seminario 19/13: Francisco Cabo (U. Valladolid) – Interaction and imitation between Sanchos and Quixotes: A misleading evolutionary equilibrium

Monumento_al_Quijote_y_Sancho

The paper analyzes the interaction between individuals belonging to two distinct populations, who share the same strategy set but differ in their payoff matrices. A two-population evolutionary game describes this interaction, that presents a double dimension. On the one hand, agents in one population play a game against individuals within their own and also the…