Seminario 16/18: – Coralio Ballester (Universidad de Alicante) – Convergence in network guessing games

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Abstract: En este trabajo analizamos un conjunto de “concursos de belleza” (“Beauty Contests”- Nagel, AER 1995) jugados en el contexto de redes económicas/sociales. Los Beauty Contests han sido utilizados en campos como las finanzas y en el estudio de la racionalidad limitada de los agentes económicos. En concreto, fue uno de los primeros juegos en…

Seminario 16/13: – Carmen Beviá (Universidad de Alicante) – Relinquishing Power, Exploitation and Political Unemployment in Democratic Organizations

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Abstract: The paper focus on the dynamics of organizations and how they design its future according to the interest of their members. Agents are grouped into three classes, high, medium and low productivity. We analyze the evolution of organizations which take decisions by majority voting. We focus on the evolution of the political power and…

2 Noviembre: Seminario 2015/23 – V. Fragnelli (U. Piemonte Orientale) – An overview on power indexes

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Abstract Several power indices were introduced in order to account for different aspects of decisional situations. The talk presents how to deal with those situations, commonly arising in politics, in which the agents have some incompatibilities. Some comments on existing power indices and how communication structures and restricted games may allow a better evaluation of…

Seminario 15/19: N. Allouch (U. London) – Policy reform in networks: the interbank liquidity game

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Abstract This paper studies the interbank liquidity game where banks are located on a network and may access their direct neighbors’ liquidity holdings. We investigate patterns and directions of welfare-improving transfers in arbitrary networks. More specifically, we use a geometric approach to characterise two general cases – where the welfare improvement is accompanied by a…

Seminario 14/20 – Luis CORCHON (UC3M): Dynamic Contests with Bankruptcy: The Despair Effect

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Abstract In this paper we analyze a two period contest in which agents may become bankrupt at the end of the first period. A bankrupt agent is excluded from the contest in the second period of the game. We investigate the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. We distinguish between a borrowing…