Seminario 20/24: Francesco Ciardiello (Sheffield University: On Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in a Duopolistic Market Share Model
- Ponente: Francesco Ciardiello, Management School, Sheffield University, UK
- Fecha: 30/nov/2020 - 12:00 horas
- Lugar: Seminarios online CIO: meet.google.com/tiy-qjcj-wfo
This paper develops a duopolistic discounted marketing model with linear advertising costs and advertised prices for mature markets still in expansion. Generic and predatory advertising effects are combined together in the model. We characterize a class of advertising models with some lowered production costs. For such a class of models, advertising investments have a no-free-riding strict Nash equilibrium in pure strategies if discount rates are small. We discuss the entity of this efficiency at varying parameters of our advertising model. We provide a computational framework in which market shares can be computed at equilibrium, too. We analyze market share dynamics for an asymmetrical numerical scenario where one of the two firms is more effective in generic and predatory advertising. Several numerical insights on market share dynamics are obtained. Our computational framework allows for different scenarios in practical applications and it is developed, thanks to Mathematica software.