Seminario 18/12: -Pedro Pintassilgo (UAlg)-International Fisheries Agreements: A Game Theoretical Approach

Información

The management of fish stocks harvested by several countries is an important economic and political issue at the international level. It is estimated that the harvests of these fish stocks account for about one third of world marine harvests. The cooperative management of international shared fish stocks, through International Fisheries Agreements, has proven to be difficult worldwide.

This seminar approaches the formation and stability of International Fisheries Agreements through the use of game theory, which studies the strategic interactions between decision makers, players, using mathematical models called games. Partition function games, non-cooperative games of coalition formation, will be presented and their main results regarding International Fisheries Agreements explored. A key message that emerges from these games is that self-enforcing cooperative management of internationally shared fish stocks is generally difficult to achieve.