- Referencia: García Martínez, J. A y Fernando Vega-Redondo: “Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism”. 2024, Games and Economic Behavior, (2015), 92, 74-105.DOI:
ABSTRACT In this paper we propose a stylized model to study how cohesion may affect the spread and consolidation of altruism in a large population where agents are involved in a local public-good contribution game with their neighbors. We show that, if the contribution cost is moderate (neither too high nor too low), cooperation can…
- Referencia: Albadalejo, I, M. P. Martínez-García y M.I. González-Martínez: “Quality and endogenous tourism: an empirical approach”. 2024, Tourism Management, April 2014, vol. 41, 141-147.DOI:
ABSTRACT We propose a theoretical model and an empirical study that highlight the role of quality of tourism services and endogenous tourism in long-run economic growth. We study a theoretical growth model of international trade where tourism is the growth engine and quality of tourism services has a positive impact on long-term growth. We also…
- Referencia: Albadalejo, I y M. P. Martínez-García: “An R&D endogenous growth model of international tourism”. 2024, Tourism Economics, August 2015, vol. 21(4), 701-719.DOI:
ABSTRACT According to the tourism area life cycle (TALC) model of Butler (1980), the evolution of a touristic destination follows an S-shaped curve which is upper-bounded by its carrying capacity, usually assumed to be a fixed constant. This forecast prevents a tourism-based economy from maintaining positive growth rates in the long run. However, infrastructures, transportation…
- Referencia: y Martínez Sánchez, F: “Versioning Goods and Joint Purchase: Substitution and Complementarity Strategies”. 2024, Prague Economic Papers, in press.DOI:
ABSTRACT In the present paper, we develop a monopoly model of vertical product differentiation for analyzing the monopolist’s decision about the possibility of versioning goods as substitutes or complements when consumers can buy them simultaneously. In this context, we find that versioning goods as substitutes or complements is optimal for the monopolist if the cost…
- Referencia: López-Cunyat, J y Francisco Martínez-Sánchez: “Anti-piracy policy and quality differential in markets for information goods”. 2024, European Journal of Law and Economics, 39(2), 375-401.DOI:
ABSTRACT In this paper we analyze the strategic decisions of the government, the incumbent and the pirate in a market where the good is piratable. Like in other studies, we show that deterred or accommodated piracy can occur in equilibrium, but pure monopoly cannot occur for any anti-piracy policy. We prove that the initial quality…
- Referencia: González-Maestre, M y Francisco Martínez-Sánchez: “Quality choice and advertising regulation in broadcasting markets”. 2024, Journal of Economics, 114(2), 107-126.DOI:
ABSTRACT We consider the role of the endogenous choice of platform quality in a broadcasting duopoly market where competing media platforms also choose their levels of advertising. We compare the equilibrium levels of quality, advertising and welfare under private and mixed duopoly competition.We show that the welfare comparison between the private and mixed duopoly regimes…
- Referencia: González-Maestre, M y Francisco Martínez-Sánchez: “The Role of Program Quality and Publicly-owned Platforms in the Free to Air Broadcasting Industry”. 2024, SERIEs – Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, 5(1), 105-124.DOI:
ABSTRACT In this study, we consider the role of a publicly owned platform and programme quality in the free-to-air broadcasting industry. We compare the equilibrium levels of advertising under private and mixed duopoly competition, and show that the connection between programme quality and advertising incentives is drastically different in each scenario. We also consider the…
- Referencia: y Martínez Sánchez, F: “Time to Market and Impatient Customers”. 2024, Bulletin of Economic Research, 65 (2), 194-202..DOI:
ABSTRACT We analyse the decision of firms about when to launch their products on the market when they produce differentiated goods and compete on prices. We find two subgame perfect equilibria: one in which the high-quality firm holds its leadership in quality, and another in which the low-quality firm leapfrogs its rival. When the initial…
- Referencia: Valera-Peña, J. C y Ana Meca: “Litigate or Mediate GameTheory cooperates with Law”. 2024, Boletín de la Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, Vol. 31, núm. 3, pp 1-33.DOI:
ABSTRACT We all are in conflict. Throughout our evolution to a world of limited resources, it is common the clash between people whose interests are contrary. It can be said that in this context the conflict itself is neither positive nor negative, it is natural and necessary for growth and change, and it is inseparable…
- Referencia: Guilló, M. D y Fidel Pérez Sebastián: “Convergence in a Dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin Model with Land”. 2024, Review of Development Economics, 19, 3, 725-724, 2015.DOI:
ABSTRACT Convergence among nations that share the same preferences and technologies is a key result of the closed-economy neoclassical growth framework that has received substantial support in the data. However, Heckscher–Ohlin versions of the two-sector neoclassical growth model predict that nations that differ in their capital–labor ratios may not converge to the same steady state,…